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In this paper we ask whether recent claims that the US government should switch from the tax 
credit system to the exemption system are justified. We study corporate taxation in a model 
where international capital flows are either greenfield investment projects or acquisitions of 
existing firms, and where investment is motivated by either cost reduction or market entry 
reasons. The paper asks how corporate taxation affects the international allocation of capital 
under different double taxation regimes. We find that the standard view on international 
taxation only prevails in the case of cost driven greenfield investment. In all other cases the 
deduction system is no longer optimal from a national perspective and the foreign tax credit 
system fails to ensure neutrality. However, the desirability of the tax exemption system has to 
be qualified. We show that the cross border cash flow tax system dominates the exemption 
system in terms of optimality properties. 
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Recent tax policy contributions claim that the US government should abandon the
tax credit system for the taxation of foreign pro￿ts and switch to the exemption
system (Desai & Hines (2003, 2004)). The authors point out that the tax credit
system is appropriate in a world where foreign investment reduces the domestic
capital stock. In such a setting, which is often related to the notion of green￿eld
investment, ￿rms decide whether to set up new production facilities at home or
abroad, or even relocate existing plants to the foreign country. But empirically, a
large part of US foreign investment occurs in the form of mergers and acquisitions
(m&a). Foreign investment then leads to a change in the ownership of existing
production facilities, rather than a relocation of economic activity.1 Desai and
Hines (2004) argue that the current U.S. taxation of foreign pro￿ts creates an
undesirable disadvantage for American ￿rms trying to acquire foreign ￿rms and
conclude: ￿e¢ ciency requires that foreign investment income face no residual tax
upon repatriation￿(p. 938).
From an analytical point of view, the point made by Desai and Hines has two
conceptual dimensions. The ￿rst dimension is the di⁄erence between green￿eld
investment, i.e. creating new production facilities, and m&a transactions, i.e.
purchasing existing production facilities. The second dimension is the di⁄erence
between a setting in which investment abroad decreases investment at home and a
world in which these two investment levels are not linked at all. The assumption
of mutually exclusive investment projects is appropriate when e.g. outsourcing is
analyzed, i.e. a relocation of existing production facilities to bene￿t from lower
production costs abroad. In the following, we will refer to this type of investment
as cost driven investment. In contrast, assuming mutually independent investment
projects is adequate when foreign investment increases the ￿rm￿ s overall capital
stock. This is typically the case for investment projects which provide access to a
new market. We will therefore refer to this second type of investment as market
1As Desai & Hines (2004) put it, ￿a very high fraction of such investment takes the form
of acquiring existing businesses. Consequently, most FDI represents transfers of control and
ownership, and need not involve transfers of net savings. (...) The modern view of FDI as
arising from productivity di⁄erences among ￿rms, with ownership changes taking the form of
FDI, raises the possibility that greater outbound FDI need not be associated with reduced domestic
investment.￿(p. 956)
1entry investment. 2
In the argument made by Desai and Hines, m&a are related to the concept
where foreign investment does not reduce domestic investment. This may be ap-
propriate in many cases. But in general it is not clear, that a foreign acquisi-
tion leaves domestic activity of a ￿rm una⁄ected. Likewise, green￿eld investment
abroad may have no impact on domestic investment of a multinational ￿rm. If
the investment provides access to a new market, it may even increase domestic
activity.
From an analytical point of view, it is desirable to treat these two dimensions,
green￿eld vs. m&a investment and cost driven vs. market entry investment,
separately. Table 1 illustrates this further. The argument provided by Desai &
Hines (2003, 2004) builds on two crucial di⁄erences to the standard model which
is usually associated with the seminal paper by Feldstein & Hartman (1979).3 A









Table 1: Concepts of optimal taxation issues
In this paper we o⁄er a framework which treats both conceptual dimensions
independently. We analyze the e⁄ects of di⁄erent tax regimes on international
investment and derive optimal tax policy strategies both from the national and the
2In the international economics literature, these two types of foreign direct investment are
alternatively labeled vertical (cost driven) and horizontal investment (market entry, see Markusen
(2002)). We are aware that this terminology may be controversial. Cost driven foreign investment
may also have positive e⁄ects on domestic activities of a ￿rm, so that, after all, the domestic
and foreign investment may again be complementary to some extent. Equivalently, market entry
investment abroad may of course a⁄ect domestic investment e.g. by increasing demand for the
￿rm￿ s products. These labels just serve to illustrate the conceptual di⁄erence between the two
types of investment decisions, further discussed in section 2.
3Other standard references are Musgrave (1969), Bond & Samuelson (1989), Bucovetsky &
Wilson (1991).
2global perspective. Our main interest is to ￿nd out if the basic results and policy
recommendations generated by the standard capital mobility model carry over to
di⁄erent settings with market entry investment instead of cost-driven investment,
and m&a rather than green￿eld investment. These results include the ability of
the foreign tax credit system to implement neutrality of taxes for the location of
investment (Musgrave (1969)) and the national optimality of the deduction system
(Feldstein & Hartman (1979)).
Our ￿ndings suggest that the standard results on the optimal taxation of for-
eign pro￿ts are based on a concept of international investment which is too narrow.
Firstly, we ￿nd that it is not optimal for an individual country to tax foreign source
income according to the full taxation after deduction system (Feldstein & Hart-
man (1979)), except for the case of cost driven green￿eld investment. Secondly,
the foreign tax credit system fails to achieve globally optimal capital ￿ ows in all
cases except for cost driven green￿eld investment. In the case of m&a investment,
this happens because an acquisition implies the transfer of an asset which pro-
duces taxable income between two owners which may be taxed di⁄erently. If the
income of the acquiring ￿rm is taxed more heavily than the income of the seller,
acquisitions are distorted. Thirdly, the exemption regime, which generates overin-
vestment in the low tax country in the case of cost driven green￿eld investment, is
superior in terms of both national and global welfare for both types of market entry
investment. But for cost driven m&a transactions, the exemption system again
leads to overinvestment in the low tax country, and national and global welfare
maximization requires a cross border cash ￿ ow tax regime.
These ￿ndings do not only challenge standard results of international tax the-
ory. They also have important policy implications. Firstly, they con￿rm that the
exemption system is superior to the tax credit system from a national perspective if
foreign investment in the form of m&a plays an important role and some additional
conditions are met. This also implies that some European countries like Germany
which are considering to give up their exemption systems may neglect important
costs of such a move. Secondly, our results are relevant for the ongoing debate on
corporate tax coordination in the European Union. Di⁄erences in source based
corporate income taxes are often seen as a major source of investment distortions
in the European internal market. Our analysis suggests that a move towards more
3residence based taxation through the use of tax credit systems may introduce new
distortions, distortions of corporate ownership structures, which may not be less
harmful.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. In section 2, we discuss some
conceptual issues and brie￿ y review the related literature. Section 3 presents the
model and the results. Section 4 discusses some extensions. In section 5, we discuss
some theoretical and empirical implications of our results and conclude.
2 Conceptual issues, de￿nitions and related lit-
erature
In this section, we provide the conceptual basis for the model analysis in section 3.
We explain the di⁄erence between green￿eld investment and m&a in our theoretical
approach (2.1), we deal with the distinction between cost driven and market entry
investment (2.2), and we brie￿ y discuss optimality criteria for international tax
regimes (section 2.3).
2.1 Mergers and acquisitions versus green￿eld investment
As recent surveys on the impact of taxes on cross-border capital ￿ ows, like Devereux
(2006) and Hines (1999), show, virtually all studies treat investment ￿ ows as if they
were green￿eld projects. But, capital ￿ ows in the form of border crossing m&a
are empirically important. Table 1 shows the FDI out￿ ows from di⁄erent regions
and countries into the rest of the world in 2004 (column 2).4 Columns 3 and 4
report m&a purchases in absolute value and, in italics, as a fraction of overall net
FDI out￿ ows. For example, in 2004, US ￿rms purchased other ￿rms abroad for
the amount of 110 billion dollars; this was 48% of net FDI out￿ ows of the US
economy.
4Note that these are net out￿ ows, which are calculated as investment minus disinvestment.
4FDI outflows
Region/economy 2004
World 730,257 380,598 52.1%
Developed economies 637,360 339,799 53.3%
European Union 279,830 164,677 58.8%
United States 229,294 110,022 48.0%
Japan 30,951 3,787 12.2%
Developing Economies 83,190 39,809 47.9%
Notes: UNCTAD data, World Investment Report 2005. FDI outflows are net flows, i.e.
investment minus divestment, from the reporting country or region (column 1) into the
rest of the world. FDI outflows indicate disinvestment. M&A purchases are the value
of purchased firms abroad.
Table 1: FDI outflows and M&A purchases abroad of different regions and
countries in millions of dollars.
M&A Purchases
2004
What are the key di⁄erences between green￿eld investment and m&a from a
tax policy perspective? In this paper, we use the following simple
De￿nition 1
Green￿eld investment is the purchase of internationally mobile capital goods and
the choice of a location for production.
M&a investment is the purchase of an existing and immobile production facility.
In the literature, the tax policy implications of capital ￿ ows in the form of
m&a have been neglected almost completely. An exception is a contribution by
Devereux (1990), who does not refer explicitly to mergers and acquisitons but
points out that tax distortions of ownership patterns may be important if capital
productivity depends on ownership. The paper introduces the concept of ￿capital
ownership neutrality￿ as a property of tax systems which avoid distortions in
ownership.5 Moreover, there are the two papers mentioned above, Desai & Hines
(2003) and Desai & Hines (2004), which do not include a formal model though,
and focus on U.S. tax policy.6
5Gordon & Bovenberg (1996) consider cross border acquisitions in a model with asymmetric
information in order to explain the correlation between savings and investment reported by
Feldstein & Horioka (1980). Fuest & Huber (2004) analyze tax policy in a model where ￿rms
may be sold to foreign investors, but they focus on the integration of personal and corporate
income taxes, and no border crossing acquisitions take place in equilibrium.
6See also the debate between Grubert (2005) and Desai & Hines (2005).
5Mergers and acquisitions play an important role in the literature on multina-
tional ￿rms and their investment behavior (including both types of investment,
green￿eld investment and m&a), surveyed by Markusen (2002).7 Empirical evid-
ence on m&a is reported by Andrade, Mitchell & Sta⁄ord (2001) and others.8
How does taxation a⁄ect m&a activity? As Auerbach & Slemrod (1997) and
Kaplan (1989) suggest, taxes may be of crucial importance for m&a investment.
There are some papers discussing the impact of the 1986 U.S. tax reform on ac-
quisitions of US ￿rms by foreign investors. Here, the main idea is that the e⁄ective
increase in the tax burden caused by the 1986 tax reform induced investors loc-
ated in countries with foreign tax credit regimes to take over U.S. ￿rms because
the higher US taxes were credited against home country taxes (Scholes & Wolf-
son (1990), Collins, Kemsley & Shackelford (1995)). Swenson (1994) applies the
same argument to US inbound foreign direct investment and ￿nds robust evidence
supporting the hypothesis. In a recent paper, Huizinga & Voget (2005) study the
empirical impact of international taxation schemes on m&a activity. The authors
￿nd robust and signi￿cant evidence for the deterring impact of double taxation on
cross-border acquisitions.
2.2 Cost driven versus market entry investment
The question of how foreign investment a⁄ects domestic investment is an import-
ant issue for international tax policy. In the seminal paper by Feldstein & Hartman
(1979), the capital stock is of ￿xed size. This implies that each unit of capital inves-
ted abroad reduces the capital stock at home by one unit. In contrast, in a widely
cited paper on the taxation of border crossing investment, Mintz & Tulkens (1996)
consider a model where multinational ￿rms may invest in two countries which face
a perfectly elastic supply of capital, so that a change in foreign investment does
not a⁄ect domestic investment.
In this paper, we take into account both cases, mutually exclusive and mutually
independent investment. In order to distinguish these two types of investment, we
7There are also some recent theoretical papers on merger policy (Hau￿ er & Nielsen (2005))
as well as on m&a and trade policy (Huck & Konrad (2004)).
8These include Schoar (2002), McGuckin & Nguyen (1995), Rossi & Volpin (2004) and Di Gio-
vanni (2005).
6introduce the labels of cost driven investment and market entry investment.9 In
the case of cost driven investment, a ￿rm invests abroad rather than at home
to bene￿t from lower prices for factors of production which are available at the
foreign location. In this case, the alternative to foreign investment is domestic
investment. Therefore, more foreign investment implies less domestic investment.
Things are di⁄erent in the case of market entry investment. In this case, an
investment project may or may not be pro￿table, but at least at the ￿rm level,
the alternative to investing in a given country is not to invest at all, rather than
investing in another country. We therefore introduce
De￿nition 2
Cost driven investment projects are mutually exclusive. The project is realized
either in the domestic or in the foreign country. Investment abroad reduces
investment at home.
Market entry investment projects are carried out as long as the project return is
non-negative. Investment abroad does not a⁄ect domestic investment.
A priori, there is no reason to assume that cost driven investment is linked to
green￿eld investment, and market entry investment to m&a transactions, or vice
versa. Therefore, we consider all four cases: green￿eld with cost and market entry
motives, and m&a with cost and market entry motives.
2.3 Optimal tax policy and regimes of international taxa-
tion
Starting with Feldstein & Hartman (1979), a broad literature evolved on the ques-
tion of how to optimally tax foreign source income. Horst (1980), as well as Keen
& Piekkola (1997) relax the assumption of a ￿xed capital stock and consider the
e⁄ect of taxes on savings. Grubert & Mutti (1995) consider two speci￿c cases
of investment, portfolio investment on the one hand and R&D investment on the
9These are just labels which serve to illustrate an analytical distinction. Another frequently
used terminology is the distinction between horizontal and vertical investment, for a discussion
see e.g. Markusen (2002), p.5.
7other hand. However, the standard results derived by Feldstein and Hartman
prevail. Janeba (1995) and Mintz & Tulkens (1996) analyze the desirability and
the e⁄ects of double taxation agreements.10 Devereux & Hubbard (2003) derive
welfare e⁄ects of taxes on foreign source income of multinational enterprises.
For the following analysis, it is useful to introduce two optimality criteria:
De￿nition 3
National optimality (NO) prevails if investment decisions cannot be changed
without reducing national income.
Global optimality (GO) prevails if investment decisions cannot be changed without
reducing global income.
The standard view derived in the Feldstein-Hartman model is that NO is sat-
is￿ed by a tax system which fully taxes foreign source income after deducting
foreign taxes. GO is given if foreign taxes are credited against domestic taxes. In
the following section, we ask whether these results carry over to a framework which
distinguishes cost driven vs. market entry and green￿eld vs. m&a investment.
3 A model of international capital ￿ ows with
taxes
There are two locations for investment, the domestic country and the foreign coun-
try. In the domestic country, there are many ￿rms investing domestically and
abroad owned by a representative domestic household. We refer to these ￿rms as
investor ￿rms. For notational convenience, we normalize their number to unity.
In the following, we ￿rstly analyze green￿eld investment as a reference case
before we focus on m&a investment.
3.1 Green￿eld investment
The representative investor ￿rm purchases capital goods at a price denoted by p.
These goods are internationally tradeable and they are supplied by a capital goods
10Further contributions are surveyed in Fuest, Huber & Mintz (2005).
8industry located in the domestic country. This industry has constant average and
marginal costs equal to p. This implies that the supply of capital is perfectly
elastic.11
Each green￿eld investment project requires one unit of capital. As indicated in
section 2, it is important whether i) investment abroad implies that an equivalent
investment at home cannot take place (cost driven investment) or ii) investment
abroad simply increases the capital stock of the domestic investor ￿rm (market
entry investment). We will discuss both cases in turn.
3.1.1 Cost driven green￿eld investment
The representative investor ￿rm considers realizing a green￿eld project in its home
country or abroad. The return of project j is denoted ￿cj if located in the do-
mestic country and ￿￿
cj if located abroad. The subscript c stands for ￿ cost driven￿ .





of two jointly distributed variables
(￿c;￿￿
c) 2 R2 with the density function #(￿c;￿￿
c) and the distribution func-
tion ￿(￿c;￿￿
c). We assume that after-tax pro￿ts are always strictly non-negative
in both locations.12 For a given domestic pro￿t ￿c; the ￿rm will choose the foreign
location for all projects with a return above a critical value ￿￿m




c (1 ￿ ￿
￿) ￿ T(￿
￿m
c ) ￿ p = ￿c (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ p (1)
where ￿ (￿￿) is the domestic (foreign) corporate income tax rate and T(￿￿m
c )
is the repatriation tax, i.e. the domestic tax on foreign pro￿ts.13
Figure 1 illustrates the model. All projects are located in the (￿c;￿￿
c) space.
In the absence of taxes, equation (1) becomes ￿c = ￿￿m
c . The 45 degree line in
￿gure 1 illustrates locational indi⁄erence in this case. All projects above this line
11The assumption of an elastic capital supply follows Mintz and Tulkens (1996) and constitutes
an important di⁄erence to the Feldstein-Hartman model. In section 4, we consider the case of a
￿xed capital stock.
12We abstract from the possibility that either domestic or foreign investment yields a negative
pro￿t because this would take us to a setting where investors choose between investing in one
of the two countries and not investing. This case is analysed below, under the heading ￿ market
entry investment￿ .
13We assume that the distribution of pro￿ts across jurisdictions is given. We thus abstract
from the possibility of shifting pro￿ts across countries via debt or transfer pricing.









Figure 1: Cost driven green￿eld investment
In the presence of taxes, the locational indi⁄erence line may shift. In ￿gure
1, the graph shows the case where foreign pro￿ts are exempt from domestic taxes
(T(￿￿m






, and the domestic country is the
high tax country (￿ > ￿￿). In the shaded area, all projects are realized in the
foreign country. In the absence of taxes, they would have been located in the
domestic country.
In this paper, we will consider four di⁄erent regimes for taxing foreign pro￿ts.
These are
1. The exemption system: T(￿￿
c) = 0:
2. The full taxation after deduction system: T(￿￿
c) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿￿
c:
3. The foreign tax credit system: T(￿￿
c) = (￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿￿
c
4. The cross border cash ￿ ow tax system: T(￿￿
c) = ￿[(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿￿
c ￿ p].
What are the implications of corporate taxation for national and global welfare?
National income from domestic and foreign investment is given by domestic pro￿ts




























c) for notational simplicity. The e⁄ect of a change in the
10cuto⁄ value ￿￿m













This implies that national optimality requires all investment projects to be
located abroad if, for a given ￿c; ￿￿
cj ￿ ￿￿NO
c , where ￿￿NO
c is given by:
NOc: ￿
￿NO
c (1 ￿ ￿
￿) = ￿c (4)
Global income includes foreign and domestic pro￿ts before taxes. Therefore,
globally optimal investment requires
GOc: ￿
￿GO
c = ￿c (5)
Which regimes for taxing foreign pro￿ts lead to national and global optimality?
Comparing (1) and (4) shows that nationally optimal investment is achieved if
T(￿￿
c) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿￿
c, i.e. foreign pro￿ts are taxed according to the full taxation
after deduction system (Feldstein & Hartman (1979)). Global optimality requires
T(￿￿
c) = (￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿￿
c, i.e. taxation according to the foreign tax credit system. We
may summarize these ￿ndings as
Proposition 1 In the case of cost driven green￿eld investment, the full taxation
after deduction system is nationally optimal. The tax credit system is globally
optimal.
These results are of key importance in the theory of international taxation. For
the following analysis, they will serve as a benchmark.
3.1.2 Market entry green￿eld investment
Consider now the case of market entry investment. The idea is that the repres-
entative domestic investor ￿rm considers whether or not to carry out a green￿eld
investment project in the foreign country. Again, each project requires one unit of
capital which is available at a price of p. The return of project j is now denoted by
￿￿
ej, where the subscript e stands for ￿ entry￿ . For each project, the representative
11investor ￿rm draws a return ￿￿
ej of a variable ￿￿
e 2 R with density #(￿￿
e) and
distribution ￿(￿￿
e). Firms will carry out all projects in the foreign country with
returns ￿￿
ej ￿ ￿m￿
e , where the cuto⁄ value ￿m￿
e is given by
￿
m￿
e (1 ￿ ￿
￿) ￿ T(￿
m￿
e ) ￿ p = 0 (6)
National income increases with every project where the return after foreign
taxes exceeds the investment cost p. Nationally optimal investment in the foreign
country is therefore given by
NOe: ￿
NO￿
e (1 ￿ ￿
￿) = p (7)
Comparing (6) and (7) shows that the nationally optimal tax on the marginal
foreign investment project is equal to zero, T(￿m￿
e ) = 0. There are two ways of
implementing this. The ￿rst is to exempt foreign income from domestic taxation.
The second is to tax foreign pro￿ts according to the cross border cash ￿ ow tax
system, where T(￿￿
e) = ￿ [￿￿
e (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿p], which also leads to ￿m￿
e (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿p = 0:
How about global optimality? Given that the price of capital is constant, global
optimality requires that all investment projects are carried out where the return
before taxes exceeds the price per unit of capital. The globally optimal cuto⁄value
for investment in the foreign country is:
GOe: ￿
GO￿
e = p (8)
None of the four tax regimes considered here can assure global optimality in
this case. The reason is that national tax systems do not allow for a deduction
of the costs of capital and therefore distort domestic investment. The best that
can be done from a global point of view is to set T(￿m￿
e ) = 0 by using either the
exemption system or the cross border cash ￿ ow system.
This may be summarized as
Proposition 2 In the case of market entry green￿eld investment, the exemption
system and the cross border cash ￿ow systems are nationally optimal. Neither of
the four tax regimes under consideration achieves global optimality.
12Proposition 2 shows that the national optimality of the full taxation after de-
duction system may even vanish in the case of green￿eld investment, provided that
this investment does not reduce domestic investment. However, this ￿nding critic-
ally depends on the assumption of an elastic supply of capital. In section 4, we will
consider the case where the global supply of capital is inelastic. In such a setting,
foreign market entry green￿eld investment crowds out domestic investment, and
the national optimality of the full taxation after deduction system and the global
optimality of the tax credit system are restored under certain conditions.
3.2 Mergers and acquisitions
The model used in the preceding section is modi￿ed as follows. The domestic rep-
resentative investor ￿rm now only undertakes investment projects in the form of
acquisitions. Next to the investor ￿rm, there are N (N￿) existing ￿rms in the do-
mestic (foreign) country. We refer to these ￿rms as target ￿rms. Initially, domestic
(foreign) target ￿rms are owned by the domestic (foreign) representative house-
hold. Under their initial owners, domestic (foreign) target ￿rms earn a uniform
pre-tax pro￿t ￿ (￿￿).
An important question arising at this point is whether acquisitions have real
economic e⁄ects. We assume that this is the case. If a target ￿rm is acquired by
the investor ￿rm, the target ￿rm￿ s pre-tax pro￿ts change, and we denote this pro￿t
change by the variable ￿. Target ￿rms are immobile, i.e. the cost of transferring
their assets to another country is prohibitively large. This immobility implies that
the market price of target ￿rms may di⁄er across countries, even if these ￿rms
are identical in all other respects. The price the investor ￿rm pays for a domestic
(foreign) target ￿rm is denoted by q (q￿). Again, we distinguish between cost
driven investment and market entry investment.
3.2.1 Cost driven m&a investment
The investor ￿rm faces a large number of potential acquisition projects. The pro￿t
change achieved by project j is assumed to be ￿cj if the acquisition is made in the
domestic country and ￿
￿
cj if the acquisition is made abroad. For each project,






of two jointly distributed
13variables (￿c;￿
￿
c) 2 R2 with density #(￿c;￿
￿
c) and distribution ￿(￿c;￿
￿
c). We assume
that the number of target ￿rms in each country exceeds the overall number of
acquisition projects.14 For a given domestic pro￿t change ￿c, the ￿rm will choose




c , where ￿
￿m








c ) ￿ q
￿ = (￿ + ￿c)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ q (9)
The market for target ￿rms is assumed to be perfectly competitive, so that
the initial owners receive their reservation income, i.e. q = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) and q￿ =
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿).15 Given this, (9) boils down to
￿
￿m




c ) = ￿c (1 ￿ ￿) (10)
What are the implications of taxes for the national and global optimality of
private investment decisions? National income from domestic and foreign invest-

































c). Using q￿ = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿), the e⁄ect of a change in the cuto⁄
value ￿
￿m


















This implies that national optimality requires all investment projects to be




c , where ￿
￿NO
c is given by:
NOc: ￿
￿NO
c (1 ￿ ￿
￿) = ￿c (13)
14If this assumption is relaxed so that equilibria may arise where the the investor ￿rm acquires
all ￿rms in at least one country, taxes cease to a⁄ect capital ￿ ows. This case is neither realistic
nor interesting.
15In section 4.2., we consider the case where the purchase price is determined by bargaining
and initial owners receive part of the surplus.
14Global income includes foreign and domestic pro￿ts before taxes. Therefore,
globally optimal investment requires
GOc: ￿
￿GO
c = ￿c (14)
Which regimes for the taxation of foreign pro￿ts lead to national and global
optimality? In the case of cost driven green￿eld investment, the deduction system
is optimal. Here, applying the deduction system, T(￿￿ +￿
￿
c) = ￿(￿￿ +￿
￿
c)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
in (10), would imply:
￿
m￿
c (1 ￿ ￿









Equation (15) shows that the deduction system does not lead to nationally
optimal investment. The return of the marginal foreign project is too high, which
means that too few foreign acquisitions take place. The reason is that, under the
deduction system, the repatriation tax gives rise to an extra tax on the acquisition.
It changes the tax burden on the "unchanged" part of the income from ￿￿￿￿
under the initial owner to [￿￿+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)]￿￿ under the new owner. Imposing
this extra burden on foreign acquisitions is not in the interest of national income
maximization.
If the full taxation after deduction system does not lead to national optimality,
which regime does? Using (10) and (13) reveals that national income maximization





c)(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ q￿). This regime makes sure that the repatriation tax on
pro￿ts capitalized in the purchase price is equal to zero. As a result, only the
additional income generated by the acquisition is a⁄ected by the repatriation tax.
How do the exemption system and the tax credit system perform with respect
to national optimality? Under the exemption system, T(￿￿+￿
￿
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It turns out that there are more foreign acquisitions (and less domestic acquis-
15itions) than nationally optimal. Finally, under the tax credit system the repatri-
ation tax would be T(￿￿ + ￿
￿
c) = (￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿￿ + ￿
￿
c), so that (10) becomes:
￿
￿m
c (1 ￿ ￿









Under the tax credit system, some foreign acquisitions are carried out although
national optimality would require domestic acquisitions, and vice versa. These
results can be summarized as
Proposition 3 In the case of cost driven m&a investment, the cross border cash
￿ow tax system is nationally optimal. Under the full taxation after deduction sys-
tem, foreign investment is ine¢ ciently low. Under the tax credit system, over- and
underinvestment coexist. The exemption system implies that foreign investment is
unambiguously too high.
How about the ability of the di⁄erent tax regimes to implement global op-
timality? In the case of cost driven green￿eld investment, the tax credit system
implements globally optimal investment. Does this result carry over to the case
of m&a investment? Under the tax credit system, the repatriation tax would be
T(￿￿ + ￿
￿
c) = (￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿￿ + ￿
￿
c). Using this expression in (10) leads to
￿
￿m








c if ￿ > ￿
￿ (18)
It turns out that the global optimality of the tax credit system under cost
driven green￿eld investment also fails to carry over to the case of m&a investment.
Again, the repatriation tax imposes an undesirable burden on foreign acquisitions.
Given that ￿ > ￿￿, the tax credit system implies that the new owner is subject to
a tax not faced by the initial owner. As a result, too few foreign acquisitions take
place. How can global optimality be achieved? Rearranging (10) shows that the








which is di⁄erent from all four regimes introduced above. Essentially, the
tax credit system has to be corrected for the inclusion of pro￿ts re￿ ected in the
16purchase price. There is no easy way of implementing this because it would be
di¢ cult in practice to distinguish between hypothetical pro￿ts under the initial
owner and pro￿ts generated due to the acquisition.
What are the implications of the remaining regimes for global optimality? The
exemption system will lead to overinvestment in the low tax country, as in the
case of green￿eld investment. The full taxation after deduction system yields to
underinvestment in the foreign country:
￿
￿m















Finally, the cross border cash ￿ ow tax system, with ￿((￿￿ + ￿
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i.e. foreign investment is ine¢ ciently low from a global perspective. This is
not surprising, given the national optimality of this system in the case of m&a
investment. We may thus state
Proposition 4 In the case of cost driven m&a investment, none of the four tax
regimes under consideration leads to global optimality. The cross border cash ￿ow
tax system, the full taxation after deduction system and the tax credit system lead to
underinvestment in the foreign country from a global point of view. The exemption
system implies overinvestment in the high tax country and underinvestment in the
low tax country.













Figure 2: Cost driven m&a investment
The 45 degree line describes the globally optimal margin at which ￿
￿m
c = ￿c.
The exemption system leads to overinvestment abroad, as in ￿gure 1. The space
between the exemption line and the global optimality line encompasses all projects
which are carried out in the foreign country but which should be realized in the
domestic country from a global optimality perspective. The remainder of the graph
can be interpreted accordingly. The tax credit system and the full taxation after
deduction system lead to foreign investment levels which are globally too low. The
shaded areas characterize the interesting case of the tax credit system in which
underinvestment and overinvestment coexist, seen from the national perspective.
3.2.2 Market entry m&a investment
Consider ￿nally the case of market entry m&a investment. The domestic investor
￿rm now faces the choice between acquiring a target ￿rm in the foreign country
or not investing at all. The return of project j is now denoted by ￿
￿
ej. For each
project, the representative investor ￿rm draws a return ￿
￿





e) and distribution ￿(￿
￿
e). Firms will carry out all projects in the
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e ) ￿ q
￿ = 0 (22)
Using q￿ = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿), it is straightforward to show that nationally optimal
investment in the foreign country is given by
NOe: ￿
NO￿
e (1 ￿ ￿
￿) = 0 , ￿
NO￿
e = 0 (23)
National income increases with every project where the pro￿t change caused
by the acquisition after foreign taxes on these pro￿ts is positive. Comparing (22)
and (23) shows that the nationally optimal tax on the marginal foreign investment
project is equal to zero, i.e. T(￿￿ + ￿
m￿
e ) = 0. There are again two regimes for
taxing foreign pro￿ts which allow implementing this, the exemption system and
the cross border cash ￿ ow tax system. The latter means T(￿￿ + ￿
￿
e) = ￿ [(￿￿ +
￿
￿
e)(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ q￿], which also implies T(￿￿ + ￿
m￿
e ) = 0 but does tax intramarginal
projects:
How do the tax credit system and the full taxation after deduction system
perform with respect to national optimality? The tax credit system implies T(￿￿+
￿
￿
e) = (￿ ￿￿￿)(￿￿ +￿
￿
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The tax credit system yields too little foreign direct investment. Under the full
taxation after deduction system, with T(￿￿ + ￿
￿
e) = ￿(￿￿ + ￿
￿
e)(1 ￿ ￿￿), we also
￿nd that there is underinvestment in the foreign country:
￿
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How about global optimality? Here, the qualitative results are the same be-
cause global optimality also requires all projects with a positive return to the
ownership change to be carried out, i.e.
GOe: ￿
GO￿
e = 0 (26)
19These ￿ndings may be summarized as
Proposition 5 In the case of market entry m&a investment, the cross border
cash ￿ow tax system and the exemption system lead to both national and global
optimality. The tax credit system and the full taxation after deduction system lead
to too little investment abroad, both nationally and globally.
4 Extensions
The analysis in the preceding sections is based on a highly stylised model which
uses several restrictive assumptions. In this section, we consider some extensions
and variants of the model. These include i) the case where the supply of capital
goods to the economy is inelastic, ii) the case where the initial owners of target
￿rms may bargain with investor ￿rms over the purchase price, and iii) the case
where domestic and foreign investor ￿rms compete for acquiring a given target
￿rm.
4.1 Inelastic supply of capital
While we have assumed so far that the supply of capital to the economy is elastic,
Feldstein and Hartman (1979) and many other contributions assume that the sup-
ply of capital is ￿xed. In this section, we brie￿ y sketch the e⁄ects of introducing a
￿xed capital supply in our model. This only a⁄ects green￿eld investment, and the
results change primarily in the case of market entry green￿eld investment. Due to
a ￿xed capital supply, an increase in investment abroad would drive up the price
per unit of capital p, so that investment at home c.p. declines.
This has two implications. First, nationally optimal investment again requires
that the before tax return to domestic investment is equal to the return to foreign
investment after foreign taxes. The deduction system makes sure that this condi-
tion holds. Global optimality requires equality of the before tax returns in both
countries. This is achieved if the tax credit system is applied. Second, the price
change may lead to a redistribution of income between capital owners and ￿rm
owners. If part of the capital stock is owned by foreigners, the domestic govern-
ment may want to employ the tax system to reduce investment demand, so that
20the price of capital declines. If the entire capital stock is owned by domestic house-
holds, so that the equilibrium level of p is irrelevant for overall national income,
the deduction system is again nationally optimal.
In the case of cost driven green￿eld investment, the number of projects which
are carried out is given, so that overall capital demand is also given. The existence
of an equilibrium requires the supply of capital supply to be at least as large as
the number of investment projects. If this is not the case, the capital price will
increase until the least pro￿table investment projects leave the market. But this
will not change the results concerning the optimality properties of the tax regimes
under consideration unless the choice of these regimes is in￿ uenced by the desire
to change the equilibrum price of capital.
4.2 Bargaining over the acquisition price
So far, we have assumed that the initial owners of existing ￿rms do not receive
more than their reservation pro￿t when they sell their ￿rms. But in real world
transactions, it is likely that they have some bargaining power so that they receive
part of the surplus.
Consider ￿rstly the case of cost driven m&a. The surplus generated by a
domestic (foreign) acquisition is given by ￿c (1 ￿ ￿) or ￿
￿
c (1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ T(￿￿ + ￿
￿
c),
respectively. Assume that the initial owners receive a share 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 (or 0 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
1) of this surplus, so that the acquisition prices are q = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿ [￿c (1 ￿ ￿)]
and q￿ = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)+￿[￿
￿
c (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿T(￿￿+￿
￿
c)] , respectively.16 Thus, the investor








c )] = (1 ￿ ￿)[￿c (1 ￿ ￿)] (27)
If bargaining power is equal at home and abroad, (￿
￿ = ￿), the results derived
in section 3 do not change, because the ￿s drop out.
Now, consider the case of a market entry acquisition, where the reservation
16Here, we assume that the investor ￿rm has to decide ￿rst whether to acquire the domestic or
the foreign ￿rm before negotiating, so that the reservation pro￿t in the bargaining game is equal
to zero. A more complicated setup would be one where bargaining with domestic and foreign
initial owners takes place simultaneously.
21pro￿t of the investor ￿rm is equal to zero. The investor ￿rm is indi⁄erent between
investing and not investing if
(1 ￿ ￿)[￿
m￿




e)] = 0 (28)
Again, the ￿
￿ drops out.
The implications of the di⁄erent tax regimes for global optimality are thus
the same as those derived in the case with q￿ = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿). As long as the
domestic government takes the purchase price q￿ as given, the nationally optimal
tax regime would also be the same: the cross border cash ￿ ow tax system in the
case of cost driven m&a and the exemption system in the market entry m&a case.
But since the repatriation tax a⁄ects the purchase price, it will also a⁄ect the
distribution of the surplus between the domestic and the foreign countries. The
domestic government therefore has an incentive to use the repatriation tax in order
to strategically manipulate the purchase price.
We do not analyze these strategic incentives further at this point, not only
for reasons of space but also because they have to be seen in the context of the
optimal tax rate choice. Including this would be beyond the scope of this paper.
4.3 Domestic and foreign investor ￿rms competing for ac-
quisitions
Another limitation of our analysis is that we have abstracted from the possibility
that investor ￿rms from di⁄erent countries compete for the same target ￿rm. Desai
and Hines (2003, 2004) argue that US ￿rms may be at a systematic disadvantage
when competing for foreign acquisitions, and that this is against the national
interest. Therefore assume that there is a second investor ￿rm in the foreign
country. The domestic and the foreign ￿rm bid for a target ￿rm located in the
foreign country. In order to acquire the ￿rm, the price the domestic ￿rm o⁄ers has
to be at least as high as the price o⁄ered by the foreign ￿rm. The alternative to
acquiring the ￿rm is not to invest at all, i.e. we consider market entry investment.
The change in pro￿ts which occurs if the foreign investor acquires the target ￿rm
is denoted by ￿
￿f
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It is immediately clear that any positive tax on foreign pro￿ts of a marginal
project would imply too few foreign acquisitions of domestic investors from a global
perspective. But is this also true from a national point of view? Nationally optimal







￿ ￿ 0 (31)
Using q￿ = (￿
￿f





e ￿ 0 (32)
It turns out that nationally and globally optimal investment requires T(￿￿ +
￿
m￿
e ) = 0, which may be implemented either by using the exemption system or
the cross border cash ￿ ow system. This con￿rms the results derived in the base
version of the model and also the intuition in Desai and Hines (2003, 2004). It is
straightforward to show that the results for the case of cost driven m&a are also
preserved if competition for acquisitions is taken into account.
5 Discussion of the results and concluding re-
marks
In the preceding sections we have analyzed the e⁄ects of taxes on international
capital ￿ ows when investment is m&a rather than green￿eld investment and market
entry rather than cost driven investment. It has been shown that the tax e⁄ects
may be quite di⁄erent from the e⁄ects emerging in the standard capital mobility
model. Table 2 brie￿ y summarizes the results.


















Globally optimal tax policy Nationally optimal tax policy
Table 2: Optimal tax policy strategies
What are the policy implications of the analysis? Firstly, the traditional focus
on the tax credit system in double taxation agreements and European as well as
international tax coordination proposals may be misguided. It is based on the as-
sumption that the geographical location of investment matters for its productivity
whereas corporate ownership structures do not. In the real world, however, cor-
porate ownership structures are crucial for the exploitation of synergies, for access
to technological and administrative know how and for the solution of corporate
governance problems. In an increasingly knowledge based economy with declining
communication and transport costs, these factors are likely to gain importance
relative to the geographical location of production facilities. If this is correct, tax
distortions of ownership structures deserve more attention.
Secondly, our results are relevant for the current debate in the U.S. and other
countries on the way in which taxing foreign pro￿ts of domestic corporations a⁄ects
national welfare. Our ￿ndings con￿rm the view expressed by Desai and Hines
(2003, 2004) that the tax credit system may not be optimal in cases where acquiring
foreign ￿rms are not only in the interest of the ￿rm but also in the national interest.
Interestingly, the current tax policy debate in Germany points into the opposite
direction. The fact that foreign pro￿ts are exempt from domestic taxes is often
criticized because the exemption system is seen as creating incentives for German
￿rms to invest abroad, where taxes are lower, rather than at home. A switch
to a tax credit system is seen as bene￿cial for domestic economic activity. The
results derived in this paper point to a neglected danger associated with such
a move. Currently, Germany is the country of residence of many headquarters
of multinational ￿rms. Higher taxes on foreign pro￿ts of domestic ￿rms would
24create incentives to sell foreign subsidiaries to multinational ￿rms residing in other
countries17 although this is not in the national interest.
Thirdly, our results di⁄er to what Desai and Hines (2003, 2004) suggest in two
important aspects. In the case where investors decide whether to acquire a ￿rm
at home or abroad, the tax credit system does not necessarily imply that there
are too few acquisitions from a national point of view; there may be too many
as well. Moreover, the exemption system leads to overinvestment abroad. In this
case, the cross border cash ￿ ow system is optimal from a national point of view.
In addition, such a system has the same optimality properties as the exemption
system when market entry investment is considered, see table 2.18
A fourth implication of our results is that neutrality of the tax system for all
types of capital ￿ ows seems to be hard to achieve. The optimality properties,
both from a national and a global point of view, crucially depend on the type
of investment (green￿eld or m&a investment) and the model of investment (cost
driven or market entry investment). Moreover, one should be aware that real world
investment will always have both elements, green￿eld investment and acquisition
properties. Even in seemingly pure green￿eld projects, investors typically have to
acquire a piece of land which cannot be traded in world markets, so that the value
of the land will be in￿ uenced by host country taxes.
Of course, these policy conclusions have to be seen in the light of the limitations
of our analysis. The model used in this paper is highly stylized and neglects many
aspects which are relevant for tax policy. A ￿rst extension would be to take into
account that synergy e⁄ects can also emerge in the investor ￿rm, see Becker &
Fuest (2006a). A second extension would be to consider a model where ￿rms
may choose between acquisitions and green￿eld investment. Since the two may
interact, the e⁄ects of tax policy on capital ￿ ows may be di⁄erent from a world
where only one of the two is taken into account. A third important aspect is that
di⁄erent ways of ￿nancing acquisitions and di⁄erent forms of acquisitions - share
deals versus asset deals, payments in cash or in shares of the parent company have
17Another option would be to move headquarters, a possibility not included in the analysis of
this paper.
18Of course, the OECD double taxation convention does allow an exemption system whereas
the possibility of introducing a cross border cash ￿ ow tax is not included. Therefore, the latter
is no doubt more di¢ cult to implement in practice.
25to be considered. Since tax credit systems usually imply that domestic taxes on
foreign pro￿ts are deferred until repatriation, the tax e⁄ects on capital ￿ ows may
be di⁄erent if foreign investment is ￿nanced e.g. by retained earnings of foreign
subsidiaries. A fourth very important aspect is imperfect competition. Many
multinational ￿rms operate in imperfectly competitive markets, and the interaction
between di⁄erent ￿rms in these markets is an important factor driving m&a. In
such a framework, private and social bene￿ts from mergers and acquisitions are
likely to di⁄er. Another question neglected in this paper is how capital ￿ ows in the
form of m&a a⁄ect optimal national tax policies in the presence of distortionary
taxes and public goods provision.19 We intend to deal with these issues in future
research.
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